

CONFIDENTIAL
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Congressional Record 10,843
X O.W.I. - 055

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES
WASHINGTON, D. C.

MEMORANDUM

FROM: C. W. Barnes *CWB*

March 11, 1943

TO: Colonel William J. Donovan
Director of Strategic Services

RE: Congressional Record

The Congressional Record for March 9th, Page 1758,
in a speech in the Senate by Mr. Wiley, contains the follow-
ing:

"It is apparent from all of the foregoing that Congress must closely scrutinize all the publication activities of government, and it is equally apparent that the behind-the-scenes conflicts between the O.W.I. and the Office of Strategic Services must be definitely and permanently settled so that we do not have conflicts in the field of our psychological warfare. At the outset of 1943 we still had no agreed policy or coordinated program for psychological warfare--we still had no completely unified effort, though we had a half dozen agencies working on parts of the job."



2-9-43

To: Col. W.J. Donovan

For your information.

C. F. Barnes

78th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. 316

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 11, 1943

Mr. LAXTON introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Expenditures in the Executive Department:

A BILL

Authorizing the Director of the Bureau of the Budget to reduce the personnel of executive departments and agencies.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That within thirty days after the enactment of this Act,
4 and at least semiannually thereafter, the heads of all depart-
5 ments and agencies in the executive branch of the Govern-
6 ment shall present to the Director of the Bureau of the Budget
7 such information as he shall require for the purpose of
8 justifying the number of employees in their respective depart-
9 ments or agencies. If the head of any such department or
10 agency fails to present such information or if, in the opinion
11 of the Director, the information so presented fails to dis-

2

1 close that the number of such employees in any department
2 or agency is necessary to the proper and efficient exercise
3 of its functions, the personnel of such department or agency
4 shall be reduced, within ten days after the issuance of an
5 order of the Director, by a number equal to at least twenty
6 per centum of the total number of employees on its rolls
7 on the date of issuance of such order.

8 SEC. 2. The Civil Service Commission is authorized to
9 transfer to other departments or agencies any employees
10 released pursuant to this Act whose services are needed in
11 and can be effectively utilized by such other departments or
12 agencies.

Col. Donovan

78TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 440

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 18, 1913

Mr. McKellar introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Military Affairs

A BILL

To prohibit the deferment of persons between the ages of eighteen and thirty-eight from service in the armed forces because of their employment by the United States.

- 1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
- 2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
- 3 That in the administration of the Selective Training and
- 4 Service Act of 1940, as amended, no person between the
- 5 ages of eighteen and thirty-eight, other than a person speci-
- 6 fied in section 5 (c) (1) of such Act, shall be deferred from
- 7 training or service in the land or naval forces because he holds
- 8 a civilian office or position under authority of the United
- 9 States.

Colonel Donovan:

In view of the fact that OSS must hire some aliens to do our job efficiently it might be advisable to consider action to call attention to attention of appropriate officials.

G. W. Barnes

78th CONGRESS
1st Session

S. 521

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 21, 1943

Mr. McKellar introduced the following bill; which was read twice and referred to the Committee on Civil Service

A BILL

Requiring that persons holding certain positions under the United States be citizens of the United States.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*

3 That no person shall be eligible to hold any civil position
4 or civil office under the United States, and in the continental
5 United States, unless such person is a citizen of the United
6 States.

7 SEC. 2. Any person who knowingly appoints an alien
8 to any civil position or civil office which such alien is not
9 eligible to hold under section 1 of this Act, and any alien
10 who accepts appointment to such position or office, shall
11 be guilty of a misdemeanor and shall, upon indictment and
12 conviction thereof, be fined not less than \$50 nor more
13 than \$5,000.

Colonel Donovan:

This might create somewhat of a problem in OSS.

G. W. Barnes

78TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

S. 575

IN THE SENATE OF THE UNITED STATES

JANUARY 25, 1943

Mr. McKellar introduced the following bill, which was read twice and referred to the Committee on the Judiciary

A BILL

To provide that officers in the executive branch of the Government who receive compensation at a rate in excess of \$4,500 a year shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate, in the manner provided by the Constitution.

1 *Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representa-*
2 *tives of the United States of America in Congress assembled,*
3 That for the purpose of so much of article II, section 2, of
4 the Constitution as provides that the President "shall nomi-
5 nate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate,
6 shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Con-
7 suls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of
8 the United States, whose Appointments are not herein other-

Col. Donovan

78TH CONGRESS
1ST SESSION

House Calendar No. 20

H. RES. 102

[Report No. 104]

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

FEBRUARY 5, 1943

Mr. SMITH of Virginia submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Rules

FEBRUARY 8, 1943

Referred to the House Calendar and ordered to be printed

RESOLUTION

- 1 *Resolved*, That a committee of five Members of the
- 2 House of Representatives be appointed by the Speaker of
- 3 the House, which said committee is authorized to conduct
- 4 investigations of any action, rule, procedure, regulation, or-
- 5 der, or directive taken or promulgated by any department
- 6 or independent agency of the Federal Government where
- 7 complaint is made to said committee that such action, rule,
- 8 regulation, procedure, order, or directive—
- 9 (1) Is beyond the scope of the power or authority
- 10 granted to such department or independent agency by Con-
- 11 gress or by Executive order.

Congressional Record
& Extracts
& Ridgely, Harry

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Harry S. Ridgely

DATE: Nov. 26, 1942.

TO: Col. Donovan

SUBJECT: Item from Congressional Record

On November 23, 1942 Senator Byrd of Virginia caused to be published in the Congressional Record (pp9393-9394) a public statement recently made by him. In the course of that statement the Senator said:

In time of peace the waste of public funds is to be condemned severely, but in time of war the waste of manpower by the Government in nonessential activities, as well as the waste of public funds, is inexcusable and criminal.

The Joint Committee on Reduction of Nonessential Expenditures, of which I am chairman, has already begun an investigation and will shortly start hearings to tell to the people the whole truth with respect to duplicated activities, the over-manning of practically every agency of the government, and the useless employees that are carried on the pay rolls of these agencies, and will offer constructive suggestions to remedy these conditions. There is no time to be lost. We can shorten the war by the full utilization of all our man power and reduce our casualties and cost. The Government cannot expect such utilization of America's manpower when it is itself the chief offender.

I know of no more imperative duty that Congress has now to perform than to take such action as may be necessary to eliminate those agencies of Government that are not contributing to the war effort and to institute methods of efficiency and economy in all agencies of the Government and eliminate the waste and inefficiency that now exists. *****

Excluding the civil service employees that are now engaged in mechanical and construction work, I am fully convinced that one-third of the remaining civilian employees of the Federal Government could be dismissed, resulting in a vast saving in manpower and cost and, at the same time, substantially promoting the successful prosecution of the war. *****

Harry S. Ridgely
 Harry S. Ridgely

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Harry S. Ridgely

DATE: October 16, 1942

TO: Col. William J. Donovan

SUBJECT: Item from Congressional Record

On Thursday (yesterday) October 15, 1942 the House adopted Resolution 550 which authorized and directed the House Committee on the Civil Service of which Mr. Ramspeck is Chairman -

(a) to conduct thorough studies and investigation of the policies and practices relating to civilian employment in the departments and agencies of the Government including Government-owned corporations; (b) to study and investigate the effect of such policies and practices upon the conduct of the war, with the view of determining whether such policies and practices are efficient and economical; (c) to determine the number of employees in each department or agency (including Government-owned corporations), whether such number of employees is necessary, and whether their skills are used to the best advantage; (d) all other matters relating to the recruiting and the efficient and economical use of the civilian employees; and (e) to make such inquiry as said Committee on the Civil Service may consider important or pertinent to any matter coming within the jurisdiction of said committee.

In discharging the above task the Committee is authorized to require attendance of witnesses, and the production of books, papers, documents and vouchers, as it deems necessary. For such purpose it may issue subpoenas. Upon the conclusion of the investigation the Committee is to submit its results together with its recommendations for legislation or otherwise.

Harry S. Ridgely
Harry S. Ridgely.



~~UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR~~
~~BUREAU OF LAND MANAGEMENT~~
~~WASHINGTON, D. C.~~

~~OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY FOR LAND MANAGEMENT~~

~~TO: The Secretary~~

~~FROM: The Assistant Secretary for Land Management~~

~~SUBJECT: The Proposed Revision of the~~

~~General Management Plan of the Grand Staircase-Escalante National Monument, Utah, and the~~
~~General Management Plan of the Kaiparowits Plateau National Monument, Arizona, and the~~
~~General Management Plan of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument, Arizona, and the~~
~~General Management Plan of the Grand Canyon-Redlands National Monument, Arizona, and the~~

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~~General Management Plan of the Grand Canyon-Parashant National Monument, Arizona, and the~~
~~General Management Plan of the Grand Canyon-Redlands National Monument, Arizona, and the~~

~~Recommendation of the Assistant Secretary for Land Management~~

~~The Assistant Secretary for Land Management believes that there is a pressing need~~
~~to examine closely the activities, operations, and ex-~~
~~penditures of the so-called national war agencies. It~~
~~is to be hoped that these agencies are approaching at least~~
~~a level of efficiency and discipline which~~
~~precludes the need for continued intervention~~
~~with the military effort. Nevertheless, the Committee has~~
~~hesitated to call for these so-called war and defense~~
~~agencies for minute examination because they were in the~~
~~course of organization and because of the imperative~~
~~nature of the business of most of them. However, it seems~~
~~to be more and more evident that the time is approaching for~~
~~the Committee to change its policy. ~~consequently~~~~

With such a fiscal future in view, the need for every possible economy in nonessentials is urgent. Therefore the Committee contemplates a vigorous continuation of all phases of its work for reduction of nonessential Federal expenditures.

Harry C.



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.
OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES.

Harry S. Ridgely
Free

To Col. Donovan .

From Harry S. Ridgely.

Subject Item from Congressional Record of July 1st, p.6027-30.

The President submitted to the Congress a detailed report of the expenditures made or authorized under the emergency funds for the President. The following item appears in the report:

Coordinator of Information: For general expenses: Allocated \$1,125,000.
As of May 31, 1942, Obligated \$1,070,320. Expended \$861,706.

Harry S. Ridgely

Cong. Record

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

WASHINGTON, D. C.

June 13, 1942.

To Col. William J. Donovan.

From Harry S. Ridgely.

Subject Item from Congressional Record.

The Congressional Record for June 11th reports the following:

During the consideration of the appropriation for W. F. A. Congressman Bennett of Missouri offered an amendment to forbid the purchase of automobiles or the employment of chauffeurs. The amendment was rejected, but the Congressman said among other things:

Here is a partial list of bureaucrats and Cabinet members with chauffeurs and the salaries paid their drivers by the Government:

Coordinator of Information William J. Donovan....1,320.

He also listed 23 other agencies.

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Colonel Donovan May 18, 1942

From: Mr. Harry S. Ridgely

Subject: Item From Congressional Record of May 15, 1942

During the course of the discussion in the Senate upon the Department of Agriculture's appropriation, Senator Byrd, of Virginia, made a statement showing the number of automobiles and the cost of operating them by every department and agency of the ~~Government~~. With respect to our organization, the Senator made the following statement (p.4)57):

"The Coordinator of Information has six automobiles, and the cost of operating the automobiles for the fiscal year beginning July 1, of last year, to February 28, 1942, was \$801. For these six automobiles there were seventeen chauffeurs."

Later on Senator Byrd submitted a table covering all the departments and agencies, and that table purported to show with respect to our office that during this year we had six motor vehicles, the operating cost of which was \$801.88; that such vehicles traveled 51,711 miles; that we employ full-time seventeen chauffeurs; and that the salary of our chauffeurs was \$20,520.

Harry S. Ridgely

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

M E M O R A N D U M

To: Colonel Donovan
 From: Harry S. Ridgely
 Subject: Items From Congressional Record

Date: May 5, 1942

The Congressional Record of May 1 shows that the Senate in the consideration of the so-called independent offices appropriation critically scrutinized items which had been allowed by the House of Representatives to the various Governmental agencies for traveling expenses, long-distance telephoning, publicity, newspapers and periodicals. The Senate pared down many of these items. In discussing the funds used by the various agencies for publicity, Senator Byrd of Virginia said among other things (p. 3993):

"It is estimated that 2,895 persons are giving their full time to publicity, while 31,618 persons on the Government pay roll are on a part-time basis.

The main publicity offices are the Office of Government Reports, which cost last year \$1,800,000; the Office of Facts and Figures, which cost \$950,000; the Division of Information, Office for Emergency Management, with 346 employees, which cost \$1,500,000; and the Coordinator of Information, which cost \$6,000,000. But these do not by any means represent the total, as every department has its own separate, distinct, and private publicity bureau.

The total pay roll for publicity agencies for the year ending July 1, 1941, was \$19,463,470, and other expenses \$8,306,470, and it has been increased since then.

I merely mention this, Mr. President, to indicate the broad field that still remains for very constructive economies in publicity, traveling, long-distance telephoning, and such overhead expenses.

Under the able leadership of the Senator from Tennessee (Mr. McKellar), a remarkably fine start has been made, and I hope that similar reductions will be made in other agencies of the Government as the appropriations are presented to the Senate."

The record shows the Senator Tydings of Maryland offered an amendment to the act limiting the various agencies to the expenditure of not to exceed \$50.00 for the purchase of newspapers and periodicals. The amendment was adopted by the Senate. (p. 3994).

Harry S. Ridgely

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Mr. Harry S. Ridgely
Subject: Item from Congressional Record

April 16, 1962

Congressional Record for April 15, Page 3593, reveals that Congressman Jones introduced a bill reading as follows:

"Be it enacted, etc., That none of the funds appropriated in any act shall be used by any Government department, agency, or independent establishment, except the War and Navy Departments, for these purposes, namely:

1. Publications not required by law;
2. Press service;
3. Radio broadcasting;
4. Group contacts;
5. Exhibits;
6. Motion pictures;
7. Lantern slides and lecture material;
8. Photography;
9. Individual contacts;
10. Posters;

and the amounts submitted by the departments, agencies, or independent establishments of the Federal Government to the Budget Bureau for these purposes shall not be available therefor and shall be recovered into the Treasury."

Mr. Jones' remarks accompanying the introduction of the bill disclose that he was attempting to forbid the use of public funds in the utilization of any or all of the ten facilities his bill embraces for propaganda or publicity purposes by any of the Federal Agencies. The bill, if enacted in its proposed form, would by its very terms have a wider application. It would equally forbid the use of public funds in the utilization of any or all of the ten facilities described by the bill even though its utilization was essential to the performance of lawful official functions by the particular agency or department involved.

Congressman Priest of Tennessee served notice that he would address the House on the subject next Monday.

Harry S. Ridgely

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM

To: Col. Donovan

From: Harry S. Ridgely

April 23, 1941.

Subject: Item from Congressional Record.

In connection with his ext nslon of remarks, Congressman Wigglesworth of Massachusetts inserted in the Congressional Record an article appearing in the Baltimore Sun entitled "Choked with publicity". The following paragraph in that article refers to this organization:

So bad is the present state of affairs that recently the President ordered a survey to be made with another reorganization in view. He is now being urged to coordinate all propaganda and publicity under a single head and several new men have been suggested. The fear is that this will not result in the greatly needed shrinkage and may result in lessening the effectiveness of the foreign propaganda which is being well done under the Donovan organization, but which logically should be under the War Department. It is an essential part of the military machine and should be directed by the military authorities.

The above article appears in the Congressional Record for April 21, 1942 at page A1612.

Harry S. Ridgely

Congressional Record 8/1/51
C. Edgar
Jill

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO**FROM:****DATE:****TO:****SUBJECT:**

...including "..." that "in fairness to..." at some of these alphabetical... are very well worth-while, and hereby... concluded, however, that it was his feeling that two-thirds of them should be wiped out."

March 12, 1948

S. 2200, otherwise known as the second War Powers Bill, contained title XI which provided a quick method for aliens in our armed forces to acquire United States citizenship. When the bill came under discussion in the House of Representatives, many members reached the conclusion that the title was too loosely drawn and in operation would probably result in undesirable aliens acquiring United States citizenship. The House, therefore, eliminated the title entirely. When the bill finally went

Chapman, W. H. 5/11
J. C. [unclear]
[unclear]

COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM:

DATE

TO:

SUBJECT:


... is then
 ... required
 ... reported as
 ... under
 ... Florida:


S. 11 33 07


"Under the new major reorganization of the Federal Government, wartime information policy and establishment of a new central agency as public information headquarters is expected this week, it was reported today, reliable quarters."


Harry C. Ridgely

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Office Memorandum**TO: All Staff Members**

The following reorganization and assignment of functions shall be effective from August 1, 1954, as amended or revoked by later order.

I. Coordination Committee

- A. There are hereby established Coordination Committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the government to integrate the work output of the Coordinator's office with the projects and activities of other departments and agencies. The membership of these committees shall be determined by the Coordinator with the advice and consent of the heads of the respective agencies and departments.

II. Administrative Office

- A. There is hereby created the Administrative Office of the Coordinator of Information. As the administrative head of this office there shall be an Administrative Officer who shall be responsible for the performance of the following functions:
 - a. The recruitment, placement, classification and compensation of personnel.
 - b. The office management of the Office of the Coordinator.
 - c. The preparation of annual budget and all organizational plans and reports for the Office of the Coordinator.

- d. The administrative and clerical functions necessary to the accomplishment of the work of the Coordinator's Office.
 - e. The maintenance of such confidential and personal secretarial and stenographic services as may be required by the Coordinator.
 - f. Such special duties and functions as may be assigned from time to time by the Coordinator.
- B. For the performance of these functions these units are established.
- a. Budget and Administrative Planning Unit.
 - b. Personnel Unit.
 - c. Office Services Unit.
 - d. Confidential Unit.
- C. The Administrative Officer is authorized to assign functions and duties to these units.

XIII. Special Assistants

- A. There are hereby established positions entitled Special Assistant to the Coordinator, each of whom will under direct assignment from the Coordinator be responsible for the following functions:
- a. The performance of confidential missions of strategic importance.
 - b. From Special Assistants, the correlation and interpretation of confidential and personal information.
 - c. The performance of special assignment with confidential information.
 - d. The performance of special instructions from the Coordinator on specific segments of the administrative functions of the Coordinator.

IV. Legal Branch

- A. There is hereby established a Legal Branch at the head of which there shall be a Director who will be responsible for the preparation of legal opinions and legal technical advice in and for the use and supervision of the Coordinator's office.

V. Research and Analysis Branch

- A. There is hereby established a Research and Analysis Branch at the head of which there shall be a Director who will be responsible for the performance of the following functions:
- a. The procurement and analysis of data and information from all sources, public and private, bearing upon national security.
 - b. The anticipation of strategic, current or prospective problems and situations in the foreign field, and the analysis and coordination of all pertinent data needed to cope with these problems.
 - c. The maintenance of liaison relationships with the various departments and agencies, below the level of the Coordination Committee.
 - d. The maintenance of liaison in determining the priority of requests for information received by the Division of Special Intelligence.
- B. For the purpose of carrying out the following divisions and branches of the Research and Analysis Branch, each of these divisions will be established:

2. The Coordinator's Division, in addition and also available to the staff of the staff of the Coordinator and to the various departments and agencies, information derived by the staff of the Coordinator and that derived from the Division of Special Information of the Library of Congress, and the various public and private agencies, including pictorial material received from the motion picture industry and other similar sources. Within the Central Reference Division there are established the General Information Unit, the Confidential Unit and the Graphic Library Unit.

The General Information Unit shall maintain liaison with the various departments and agencies, and collect such general information which they may have available and which is deemed pertinent to the work of the Coordinator. The Unit shall maintain files of such general information and of data received from the Division of Special Information, Library of Congress.

The Confidential Information Unit is charged with the maintenance of the Coordinator's confidential information file and with continuing relationship with the intelligence and confidential sources in the various departments and agencies.

The Graphic Library Unit shall maintain liaison with the motion picture industry and other sources of pictorial material and will provide for the use of the Coordinator's office, all pertinent pictorial material collected.

There are no other units in the Department of Defense
Air Force Unit, Army Unit, Navy Unit, Navy
Unit, Department of Defense.

- c. The Analysis Coordination Division is authorized to act as the final analytical and coordination nucleus of the Coordinator's staff in providing articulated data for coping with specific problems. Within the Analysis Coordination Division there are established the Presentation Unit and the Formulation Unit.

The Formulation Unit shall make the final analytical review and be responsible for the effectuation of all essential coordination of material prepared for submission to the Coordination Committee, and its staff shall serve as secretariat of such committee.

- d. The Territorial Division is hereby established as a series of mutually exclusive units wherein will be studied, analyzed, interpreted and correlated all information pertaining to the appropriate geographical areas, prior to submission of material to the Foreign Intelligence Division. The main territorial divisions are as follows: British Empire, the Americas, and the Far East.

Western Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, Mediterranean, Pacific area, Russia, North and Central America, Asia and Arctic. The Director of the Research and Analysis Branch is authorized to establish such territorial sub-units within each of the forenoted sub-divisions as may be desirable.

VI. Supplementary Services Branch

- A. There is hereby established a Supplementary Services Branch at the head of which there shall be a Director who will be responsible for the performance of the following functions:
 - a. The analysis and interpretation from a strategic standpoint of short wave radio material and other communications originating from foreign areas.
 - b. The initiation and conduct of short wave radio broadcasts and other communication activities necessary to maintain communication with the countries of the world.
 - c. The initiation, development and execution in the foreign field of such activity as will encourage hope and resistance amongst the peoples of conquered and embattled areas and begot a favorable attitude to the aims of democracy and the cause of anti Hitlerism.
- B. For the performance of these functions the following divisions are created in the Supplementary Services Branch, each of these divisions shall have the following functions:
 1. The Development Division for the development of new short wave radio stations and the functioning of the same.
 2. The Communications Division to utilize the short wave radio.

Within the Communications Division, there is established a Board of Directors, composed of representatives and officers of the Communications Division, to assist the division in the management of its affairs from the standpoint of international relations and foreign field. There are also established the following units:

- (1) The News Room Unit which will maintain current information on foreign and domestic developments as reported by radio and press.
- (2) The Programs Unit which will originate and develop radio programs and utilize the facilities of Broadcasting Companies for the presentation of such programs.
- (3) The Translators Unit which will be responsible for the provision of bi-lingual announcers, expert translators and language reviewers for the Communications Division.
- c. The Projects Division for the review, negotiation, execution and audit of contracts entered into by the Coordinator's Office for such supplementary activities of the branch as the Coordinator may determine.

VII. Executive Branch


- A. There is hereby established a branch at the head of which the Coordinator shall be responsible for the management of the branch.

(a) Consultation and advice with the Research and Policy Branch on economic questions.

(b) Conduct research and analysis of data bearing upon the economic problems of the United States during and following the termination of the war emergency.

B. For the performance of these functions the following divisions are created in the Economic Branch each of these divisions to be headed by a Director:

- a. Domestic Economics Division.
- b. Foreign Economics Division.
- c. Industrial, labor, and agricultural economics Division.


William J. Donovan

Coordinator of Information

August 5, 1941

AR

R-1941

August 23, 1941

MEMORANDUM

To: Colonel Donovan
From: Captain Roosevelt

Enclosed are the reports on interviews held this week,
for your information.

Respectfully submitted,

James Roosevelt

REPORT ON ARRANGEMENTS MADE WITH GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS

State Department

August 29, 1941

Liaison has been established with Under Secretary Sumner Welles and, through his office, with any and all of the other State Department Divisions. Arrangements have been made for this office to send each day a trusted representative to digest the daily State Department reports and to make them available to this office.

Department of the Treasury

Liaison has been established with Assistant Secretary Herbert E. Gaston and through him with Director of Press Relations, Charles Schwartz and with Dr. H. D. Chitt, Director of Research. Close cooperation has also been established with Mr. Samuel Klaus, Coordinating Officer of the Treasury Department for confidential information regarding Coast Guard, Customs, and other Treasury Department sources of information.

War Department

Liaison has been established with Brigadier General Sherman Miles and arrangements made to secure a daily report from War Department sources.

Department of Justice

Liaison has been established with Mr. Edward A. Tamm and a system for interchanging information will be established this coming week.

Navy Department

Liaison has been established with Captain A. G. Kirk, Chief of the Office of Naval Intelligence who, in turn, made arrangements for Commander R. E. Webb with whom a system of interchanging of information is now being arranged.

Department of Agriculture

Secretary of Agriculture, Claude R. Wickard arranged for further liaison to be worked out with Samuel B. Blodsoe, Assistant to the Secretary, and Morse Salisbury, Director of Information. This will be arranged for during the early part of next week.

Department of Commerce

Secretary Jesse Jones arranged for Mr. W. L. Clayton to coordinate all information from the Department of Commerce and the Federal Loan Agency.

- 2 -

August 23, 1941

It appears that considerable valuable information will be available through the Bureau of Foreign and Domestic Commerce within the Department of Commerce.

Maritime Commission

Through the cooperation of Chairman E. S. Land, the Secretary of the Commission, W. C. Post, Jr., and the Executive Director S. D. Shell, will make available a daily list of information compiled by the Maritime Commission.

Certain other departments will be contacted as soon as it becomes more clear which other sources of information will be required by the divisions of this office.

J. L.

To Mrs D. Dinnell
21/24/45
COLONEL DUKING

Here are the papers to the
White House on the future of the
COI that you asked me for the other
day. Will you please see that I
get them back as WJD refers to
them quite often.

M.O'D.

C. D. Dinnell
Director's Office

(3308)

May 16, 1947

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I talked with Sam Rosenman today and found him, as always, impartial, unprejudiced and open to conviction. I gave my opinion that the transfer at this time would be a serious impairment of the whole war effort; that the foreign radio service was not set up with us as something separate, but there was such an interplay of functions among all of our units that to rip this out now would tear the tissue of our whole organization; and further that, in fulfillment of my duty to the President, I should not let this be done without swinging a red lantern.

Neither Sam nor I stressed our respective divergent views but approached it from the very practical standpoint of what should be done now.

As he expressed it, the single question was a choice between two courses -- one, to have our radio propaganda service, as distinct from our political warfare and subversive services, made part of a general information

agency; or, second, to have it remain as it is now and to effect close liaison with the domestic information agency. I accepted this as the question, but suggested that at best this question could not be decided without further proof. That as a means of establishing the proof the following be done:

1. That a domestic integrated information service should be set up to see if it would work. That this domestic agency should be given power and control over the various units, rather than be compelled to rely on persuasion.
2. That a period of three months should be given to see how this experiment worked out.
3. That a close liaison should be established between the domestic radio and our own, so that there should be the fullest interchange of support and of joint action.
4. That at the end of three months a new look be given to see the result.

Among other reasons for this suggestion were the following:

- (a) That at most this was an experiment. For

-3-

the purposes of this action I was willing to concede that it was a question of fact as to which is the best method.

(b) As Sam epitomized my view, it was that the proposal being untried, "the burden of proof was on the proponents".

(c) That to try to do the whole thing at once, before it could be seen whether the domestic propaganda service could stand upon its own feet after consolidation, might jeopardize the ultimate success of any arrangement.

(d) That to permit our machine to remain as it is for the next three months would jeopardize nothing, and if at the end of three months it should be decided to make the change no harm would have been done.

(e) But if the change were to be made now, in the process of which our whole organization would be upset, and then within three months it was found to be a mistake, irreparable injury would have been done.

I tried to make clear that while my conviction is that under the present set-up we had created a weapon for you that should not be impaired, nevertheless I wanted to go to the fullest extent in examining any proposal that

-4-

Sam felt would be more effective. For that reason only I made the above suggestions.

In view of the differences of opinion that exist, such an experimental period carried on with good faith would be able to satisfy you as to what course should be followed.

One other thing I stressed with him. That is the proposed order submitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We discussed that for the moment a simple order in lieu of that should be issued. It might follow the lines of the enclosed draft. This would designate us as a supporting agency, and nothing more. It would, however, answer the basic question, and would leave the other questions to be determined later. At this moment there are many things which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to put through. The delay is hindering aggressive action on our part. These could be put through almost at once if the Chiefs of Staff knew that the fundamental question had been decided. I have talked with General William B. Smith, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he has said such an order would be acceptable "in order to relieve the log jam."

I do not know Sam's conclusion. I am sending

-2-

him a copy of this memorandum, and I hope in reading this he will feel that he can recommend it to you as a common sense course to follow. If you feel otherwise, I hope you will let me have an opportunity to discuss it with you before you reach a final decision.

No. 160
March 10, 1942
8:30 A. M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

There has been submitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff a proposed order which would bring more closely together the Office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and our own agency. They have told me that this matter has been taken up with Harry Hopkins for submission to you.

I hope you will approve the order. It exactly conforms to your original directive to me, both in name and function - but which was finally modified at the instance of the Army and Navy. The present proposal comes at their instance. The services now seem to have confidence in our organization and feel that we have in motion certain instrumentalities of war useful to them. For these reasons, and in order more closely to integrate with the armed forces the various elements that we have been developing, they recommend the signing of the order.

-2-

On March 16th (my memorandum No. 334) I briefly tried to describe to you how our principal units supplement and support one another. I think it essential that both Chiefs of Staff, under your direction as Commander-in-Chief, should have these services at their disposal. There would then be welded into one fighting force every essential element in modern warfare. You will note that they have even provided for the Commandos.

I am glad to concur in the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, because I believe this is a sensible and necessary step toward the most effective use of all modern war weapons.

No. 205

February 2, 1942
8:30 A. M.MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT:

FROM: William J. Donovan

I spoke to you some months ago of the fear I had that there would be a tendency in certain quarters to eliminate our Economic Section because of a seeming duplication with the work of the Board of Economic Warfare. I have talked with the Vice President, and he has no such fears.

There is beginning a very close and effective cooperation which it would be unfortunate to disturb. But though this cooperation exists now, it is still necessary to have economic experts in both agencies, because of the distinction that exists between the two.

The distinction between the economic work of the Coordinator's Office and the economic studies of the Board of Economic Warfare does not turn primarily on the character of the materials which are studied or on the area of the world which is covered. The distinction is based fundamentally on the nature of the operating functions which are served by the information collected in the two agencies.

**From the Files of the Director
Please Return**

-2-

The operating function of the Board of Economic Warfare is, speaking generally, the denial to the enemy of supplies which are necessary or useful to him, and the securing to the United States of supplies which are necessary to us and to our allies. The principal, though not the exclusive, means of attaining these objectives are through export control and preclusive purchasing. The economic information necessary to the pursuance of these functions should be and is assembled and analyzed in the Board of Economic Warfare.

The operating functions served by the information assembled in the Coordinator's Office are (1) psychological warfare and sabotage in enemy territory - functions which are located in the Coordinator's Office - (2) military and naval action. In serving the second function the Coordinator's Office is acting as an extension of military and naval intelligence. This has been recognized in the recent assignments given to C.O.I. by Military, Naval and Air Intelligence; and (3) a function performed by the information service of the Coordinator's Office, not associated with the operations of any single government agency, is the co-ordination and analysis of information from all sources bearing on current problems of over-all significance.

THE PRESIDENT:

: William J. Donovan

... to ... that the ...
... both domestic and foreign, ...
... elicited -- and that this would include ...

I have not heard the source of such ... I, nor
... been asked for our views -- so the ... may be
... But if any such suggestion has been made to you,
I would respectfully ask that you keep in mind certain
considerations.

They are the same considerations that led ...
at the very outset that domestic and foreign ...
should be separate. These considerations are still con-
trolling. They are even stronger when we keep in mind what
has transpired in the last six months.

In theory it would seem logical and advisable to have
one agency cover the field both at home and abroad. But

-2-

I don't need to stress with you that the difference in purpose and methods in each field calls for a difference in administration.

Now that we are at war, foreign propaganda is employed as a weapon of war. It must be primarily an attack weapon. It must be with specific strategic movement and with the flavor of subversion. It must be able to be used in a variety of ways. It must be so closely knit with the intelligence and subversive activities of the Army and the Navy that it can be effective. All of this leads to the point of fact that the use of propaganda is the first step in penetration in conditioning the area or territory in which invasion is contemplated. It is the first step -- then Fifth Column work, then military operations ("Commandos"), and then the invading divisions.

All of our experimentation in the last five years, the trials and errors we have had, have been governed by the purpose of preparing just such a weapon. And I have you from time to time, our Planning Committee.

in conjunction with the Army and Navy upon certain strategic plans. At the moment we are discussing with the State Department a plan directed toward a counter-attack against the Japanese propaganda now being used in India. Apart from the importance of the short-wave radio (to which we have added the leaflets, pamphlets, publications, etc) as an instrument of war which must be closely knit with our military strategy, there is another aspect that should not be overlooked. In the day to day criticism, inquiry and close supervision of our war activity at home our whole political structure is involved. The elections that will take place during the course of the war accentuate the close examination of what the government undertakes to do in the domestic field. There will be strong differences of opinion as to what should be said and what should not be said in the field of domestic propaganda. As it is now organized, any such inquiry in the domestic field does not affect, or affects only indirectly, our foreign broadcast policy. However, if there were a tie-up between domestic and foreign propaganda and it would compromise or destroy the necessary security, we would impair the effectiveness of psychological warfare as

nd would be likely to expose our plans and our methods to the enemy.

Several months ago you felt the necessity to fix an arbitrary line between domestic propaganda and foreign psychological warfare. That has been done. By the separation we have kept ourselves free from domestic issues and have been able to carry out the military purpose and function of our work.

No. 224

March 16, 1942

6:00 P.M.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I should like you to know how our principal units are integrated and how each one serves and supplements the other. They are four in number.

1. THE SPECIAL INTELLIGENCE SERVICE (SIS) which, through its agents in various countries outside the Western Hemisphere, especially enemy countries, obtains information not ordinarily obtained by other agencies of the government.
2. THE RESEARCH AND ANALYSIS BRANCH which analyzes and evaluates material obtained from the Special Intelligence Service and from secret and confidential documents furnished by the State, War, Navy, and other departments of the government. This material is interpreted by a team of experts, and their related studies and conclusions are made available for the use of the service arms of the government and also for the affirmative units of our organization, which are:
3. THE FOREIGN INFORMATION SERVICE (FIS), the foreign propaganda arm, operating under the direction of a Planning Board

-2-

which works closely with the State, War and Navy Departments and which, by radio, pamphlet, leaflet, posters, advertising, and other means, carries the fight to the enemy and, in turn, through its monitoring service and listening outposts, obtains information concerning the enemy; and

4. THE SPECIAL OPERATIONS SERVICE (SOS) which, working closely with the Army and the Navy, carries out subversive warfare in enemy countries.

It may be interesting to note that, to perform the above functions, the British government has some six different organizations, each of which is larger than our one organization.

I think it is safe to say that by having these closely allied operations tied together as one weapon under an order signed by the President as Commander-in-Chief, there has been obtained an Economy of Force, a vital principle in warfare.

On Mar. 11, 1964 (my memorandum No. 334) I
 briefly tried to describe to you our principal ()
 units supplementing our main operations. I think it
 essential that both Chief of Staff, and the Director
 of Commanders-in-Chief, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff
 be kept advised of our operations in order to be able to
 identify for () the various units in
 various. You will also find that the units are
 for the ()

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander-in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. The Office of the Coordinator of Information, (hereafter to be known as the Office of Strategic Information) hereby is designated as the reporting agency of the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

2. The authority is hereby vested in the Office of Strategic Information to include the personnel assigned to the Coordinator of Information, and in addition,

- (a) The planning and execution of foreign propaganda.
- (b) The conduct of political and psychological warfare against the enemy.
- (c) The organization and operation of special service units as may be directed by the United States Joint Chiefs of Staff.

3. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Director of the Office of Strategic Information.

The White House, 1942

Commander-in-Chief

By virtue of the authority vested in me as
 President of the United States, I am Commander-
 in-Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States,
 it is my order that follow:

1. The Department of the Department of Information
 is hereby authorized to report to the
 Office of the Chief of Staff of the Army.

Commander-in-Chief

The White House

May 1, 1942



UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
WASHINGTON, D. C.

April 16, 1942


General William B. Smith
Public Health Building
Washington, D. C.

Dear General Smith:

Colonel Donovan wanted you to read
the attached copy of a letter which he sent
to the President last night. When you have
read the letter will you please return it
to me.

I have also sent a copy for Secretary
Knox to read.

Sincerely,


James H. Murphy

April 14, 1942

The President

The White House

My dear Mr. President:

{ It is characteristic of you to send so thoughtful a letter as yours of the 11th instant. As Grace probably told you, I was ready to return when a blood clot, from which knee they do not know, settled in my left lung and after a few uncomfortable days is now in process of absorption. The doctors assure me that it will not be long before I shall be completely well. In the meantime, through direct connection with my office I am able to continue the supervisory, if not the active, part of my job. }

I talked with ~~Sen~~ Rosenman yesterday and was disturbed as well as surprised by the conversation. Disturbed because it indicates that since you have not yet signed the order pertaining to our alignment with the office of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a supporting agency, it must be that you have not yet

-2-

become convinced, as I am, of the necessity for some such alignment. The conversation was further disturbing because of my strong feeling that [La] preparation of any plan involving political and subversive warfare must heavily involve those entrusted with the prosecution of subsequent forms of warfare.

If this war has taught us anything, it has taught us the need for unification of all the efforts -- some new -- which play a part in modern warfare. It was for this reason that I wrote you on March 4th outlining fully the reasons for leaving the present efforts of our office coordinated into one effective whole. I would particularly call your attention to this paragraph:

Now that we are at war, foreign propaganda must be employed as a weapon of war. It must march with events. It is primarily an attack weapon. It must be identified with specific strategic movements often having within it the flavor of subversion. To do this kind

-3-

of work effectively it must be allied with the military services. It must be to a degree informed as to possible movements. The more closely it is knit with the intelligence and the physically subversive activities of the Army and the Navy, the more effective it can be. All of this necessitates security. In point of fact the use of propaganda is the arrow of initial penetration in conditioning and preparing the people and the territory in which invasion is contemplated. It is the first step -- then Fifth Column work, then militarized raiders (or "Commandos") and then the invading divisions.

It was for these same reasons that I concurred with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in their request for aligning our office with them. Further deliberation, far from causing me to change my mind, has only served to make me more convinced that the successful prosecution of this war demands such unification of all the

-4-

forces of war.

Let me add only this: at the very outset of our present relationship, it was agreed that I would deal directly with you. Due to your continued support and confidence, we have been able to set up for you an instrument of modern warfare, which, if left unimpaired, will mean for you a weapon of combined operations which will be able to stand against any similar weapon of the Axis. In doing this we have not usurped the functions or encroached upon the domain of the Army, Navy or State Department. I am sure you believe that I have no such intention. But I feel it is now my duty respectfully to urge that this weapon which has been so carefully prepared over the last eight months, which has already begun to demonstrate its usefulness, and which has won the respect of some who were skeptical at the outset, shall not be disturbed at home before it shall ever be put to its really crucial work abroad.

Respectfully,

/s/ William J. Donovan

THE JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
WASHINGTON

*Jules
Book*

4/17/42

Mr. Murphy: -

*Thanks. This is
a fine letter*

W. B. D.

May 16, 1942

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: William J. Donovan

I talked with Sam Rosenman today and found him, as always, impartial, unprejudiced and open to conviction. I gave my opinion that the transfer at this time would be a serious impairment of the whole war effort; that the foreign radio service was not set up with us as something separate, but there was such an interplay of functions among all of our units that to rip this out now would tear the tissue of our whole organization; and further, that in fulfillment of my duty to the President, I should not let this be done without swinging a red lantern.

Neither Sam nor I stressed our respective divergent views but approached it from the very practical standpoint of what should be done now.

As he expressed it, the single question was a choice between two courses -- one, to have our radio propaganda service, as distinct from our political warfare and subversive services, made part of a general information

agency; or, second, to have it remain as it is now and to effect close liaison with the domestic information agency. I accepted this as the question, but suggested that at best this question could not be decided without further proof. That as a means of establishing the proof the following be done:

1. That a domestic integrated information service should be set up to see if it would work. That this domestic agency should be given power and control over the various units, rather than be compelled to rely on persuasion.
2. That a period of three months should be given to see how this experiment worked out.
3. That a close liaison should be established between the domestic radio and our own, so that there should be the fullest interchange of support and of joint action.
4. That at the end of three months a new look be given to see the result.

Among other reasons for this suggestion were the following:

- (a) That at most this was an experiment. For

-3-

the purposes of this action I was willing to concede that it was a question of fact as to which is the best method.

(b) As Sam epitomized my view, it was that the proposal being untried, "the burden of proof was on the proponents".

(c) That to try to do the whole thing at once, before it could be seen whether the domestic propaganda service could stand upon its own feet after consolidation, might jeopardize the ultimate success of any arrangement.

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I tried to make clear that while my conviction is that under the present set-up we had created a weapon for you that should not be impaired, nevertheless I wanted to go to the fullest extent in examining any proposal that

-4-

Sam felt would be more effective. For that reason only I made the above suggestions.

In view of the differences of opinion that exist, such an experimental period carried on with good faith would be able to satisfy you as to what course should be followed.

One other thing I stressed with him. That is the proposed order submitted to you by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. We discussed that for the moment a simple order in lieu of that should be issued. It might follow the lines of the enclosed draft. This would designate us as a supporting agency, and nothing more. It would, however, answer the basic question, and would leave the other questions to be determined later. At this moment there are many things which the Joint Chiefs of Staff wish to put through. The delay is hindering aggressive action on our part. These could be put through almost at once if the Chiefs of Staff knew that the fundamental question had been decided. I have talked with General William B. Smith, Secretary of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and he has said such an order would be acceptable "in order to relieve the log jam."

I do not know Sam's conclusion. I am sending

-5-

him a copy of this memorandum, and I hope in reading this he will feel that he can recommend it to you as a common sense course to follow. If you feel otherwise, I hope you will let me have an opportunity to discuss it with you before you reach a final decision.

CO2 7020
June 15, 1948

Branch

Branch	Wh.	N. Y.	D. C.	Other	Total
Coordination Office	1				1
Section	1				1
Security	1	1			2
Executive Office (Adm. Serv.)					0
Research & Analysis	1				1
Administrative Section					0
Coordination Office					0
Sec.					0
SAO	1			1	2
Off. Intelligence		1			1
Editorial Branch	1				1
Informational Office					0
Editorial Personnel					0
Editorial Office					0
Construction of Information	1				1
Foreign Information Service	1	2	1	1	5

Total ----- 12

* Includes 51 Administrative Employees working almost exclusively for Foreign Information Service Branch.



COI 6134
Will Political Warfare
Organizational Department
Taylor
in Detail

UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
NEW YORK, N. Y.

file

May 6, 1942.

Col. William J. Donovan
Apt. 1010
Hotel St. Regis
5th Avenue and 55th Street
New York City.

Dear Colonel:

Ed Taylor left the enclosed material with me and asked me to read it through, make any comments I wished to make and forward it to you.

I have not had a chance to talk over these ideas with Ed, and I am not altogether sure that I am clear in my mind about some of them - including just what my own functions would be under this proposed arrangement. Generally speaking, though, Ed's ideas certainly seem to be eminently sound, as usual.

The job I ~~shall~~ hope to have, under whatever kind of a set-up emerges from the present consideration of the problem, would be the job I could best do and feel that it was worth doing. I share Ed's hopes that the closest possible relationship will continue to exist between present COI informational activities and the other activities which the other branches of the COI now engage in and the further activities in which other affiliated Government agencies may engage. If there is to be a fairly clear separation between our present information services and these other activities, I confess I have no idea where I could be most useful. Perhaps Ed's idea is the best one, but until I have talked it over with him - and you - I confess I am not at all sure.

Hope to see you soon.

Yours,

Wallace
Wallace R. Deuel

May 3, 1942.

Colonel William J. Donovan,
Coordinator of Information.

Dear Colonel,

I am enclosing the suggestions in regard to the proposed COI planning board which you instructed me to draw up, but in order to present them in the proper context I prefaced them with a lengthy memorandum outlining my conception--for what it is worth--of an ideal political warfare organization.

As you will note, my outline differs very little from the existing pattern of the COI. If my suggestions were adopted they would not change the basic pattern of the COI but would tend to sharpen its focus toward the single goal of political warfare. I feel very strongly that while we must function more as a clearing house for activities scattered among several branches of the government than as a separate arm, exclusively responsible for the conduct of political warfare, we need to define more clearly and apply more precisely the point of view of political warfare in all our activities. It is on the two flanks that I think we most need strengthening--the military flank and the information flank. My proposal would draw the true COI lines through the middle of SOS on one side, and through the middle of PIS on the other. We need not be afraid to handle some of the duties of the army and some of the duties of a ministry of information, but I do feel that we should regard these functions as supplementary and incidental, not essential to our mission. In the propaganda field, for instance, I feel we should concentrate on aggressive activities of direct strategic importance and not worry much about information as such or opinion in neutral and allied countries. In the SO field it seems to me that the nearer one comes to the Commando type of operation, the more we are getting away from what should be our primary mission. At the same time we must have really close liaison with the army on one side and with the government information agencies, both foreign and domestic, on the other. According to my concept of political warfare a domestic press release is just as important a weapon as a handful of guerrillas raiding an enemy village. As I see it, we are functional specialists who say to the organizational specialists, we are interested in everything you do but only from one point of view: What effect will it have on the enemy's will-to-victory, and how can that effect be assured or supported?

Regarding my personal preferences as to the type of work I would like to do for the COI, they naturally hinge to a large degree upon what happens to us. If it is going to be possible to set up some sort of independent coordinating mechanism for all the scattered political warfare activities of the government, as I propose, I would like to be attached to that body. If, however, there is a complete and unbridgeable split between informational and other types of political warfare activity, I do not think it will be possible to do any effective political warfare planning and would rather in that case have some kind of active field job. As far as the London job is concerned I should think I would be a suitable person for it only if you envisage London rather than Washington as the best spot for working out the synchronization of British and American political warfare activities. If you think England is likely to become a base for important American military activities or that it might be easier there than in Washington to establish some working relations in our fields with the political warfare services of the other Allied governments, including the Russians, then I think I might be able to do some useful work for you there.

Sincerely,

Edmund Taylor

May 2, 1942

To: Col. Donovan
 From: Edmond Taylor
 Subject: Organizational Requirements for Political Warfare.

I. The Nature of the Problem.

Although the primary purpose of this memorandum is to offer suggestions of a rather technical nature for strengthening the planning functions of the COI, it is difficult to justify them without first fitting them into the framework of political warfare as a whole. Every great power which has attempted to engage in political warfare in a systematic way has been confronted with problems of organization that have led to continuous improvisation and experimentation rather than permanent solutions. The same pattern of administrative confusion, rivalry and impermanence can be detected in the political warfare services of America, Britain and Germany. In these countries as in all others there is still debate as to what political warfare is and what organization or organizations should be responsible for its conduct.

Three factors are responsible for this confusion:

- a) Political warfare requires the integration of many forms of civilian and military activity.
- b) The civilian or military services which must participate in the conduct of political warfare have other functions not connected with political warfare.
- c) Political warfare requires the creation of new highly specialized services which have no relevance to anything but political warfare, but, precisely because they are specialized, are not fitted to achieve the integration of non-specialized ~~services~~ services.

A good illustration of the difficulty raised by (b) is the problem of the relation of the airforce to political warfare. Planes are required by the army for dropping bombs and by the political warfare authority for dropping leaflets.

The question immediately arises, should the airforce be entrusted with political warfare because it commands one of the essential instruments of political warfare? Or should political warfare have an autonomous airforce --with all the administrative problems that implies--for leaflet work? Obviously some compromise is necessary, the most natural one being that the political warfare authority should simply ask the airforce to act as distributor for leaflets, but this involves the difficulty that while the dropping of leaflets appears a matter of the highest strategic importance to the political warfare authority, it appears as an incidental activity of no great importance to men who have been ~~trained~~ trained to think in terms of two-ton bombs.

Exactly the same difficulty arises in regard to the employment of news as a political warfare weapon. An effective information and publicity service, both domestic and foreign, is a governmental necessity irrespective of political warfare. At the same time information and publicity are indispensable political warfare weapons. Yet the point of view of the government publicist and the political warfare specialist are quite different, often contradictory, and a strong case can be made against allowing either to exercise absolute control of even foreign information services in time of war.

It will help clarify the problem to examine some of the ~~main~~ governmental services most directly concerned with the execution of political warfare:

1. The armed services.

The relation between political and military warfare is a dual one. On the higher level political warfare strategy is the servant of military strategy, it softens objectives for military attack. On lower levels this relationship may

3...

be reversed. What for the military may be an objective of minor tactical importance, may be for political warfare an objective of over-riding strategic importance, and it should be one of the functions of political warfare to reveal to the military the political importance of possible ~~strategic~~ objectives. Altogether, the relationship between a political warfare organization and the armed services must be intimate on the strategic level but in a modern state it is practically impossible for the services to assume responsibility for the conduct of political warfare since this would imply the militarization of nearly all branches of the government. Political warfare, by its very nature, must be fought more with civilian than with military weapons.

2. The diplomatic service.

The relationship between political warfare and diplomacy ~~corresponds exactly with~~ corresponds exactly with the relationship between political and military warfare. On the level of high policy, political warfare suggests ~~objectives~~ psychological and political objectives for diplomatic action. On lower levels it implements by propaganda, subversive activities or ~~by~~ by other non-diplomatic means, diplomatic objectives set by ~~national~~ national policy. The same for State Department control over political warfare activities in this country is exactly as strong and exactly as weak as the case for military control.

3. Economic warfare organizations.

The pattern of the relationship is the same as in the ~~first~~ first two cases.

4. Propaganda, publicity and information services.

Propaganda is obviously one of the major weapons of political warfare and theoretically a ~~war~~ political warfare authority should have absolute control over foreign propaganda activities. In practice this is difficult because the most effective

4...

type of propaganda is authentic news, created or released by branches of the government over which the political warfare authority could never hope in this country to have any effective control. Furthermore, the relation between domestic and foreign information policy must always be a close one. The type of hortatory or emotional propaganda which is related only to the target and divorced completely from the domestic atmosphere of the place of origin can only be an auxiliary arm. Viewed realistically, the problem once more seems to be that political warfare must content itself with an advisory voice in the framing of publicity policy on the highest levels while assuming sole responsibility for the conduct of a relatively secondary form of propaganda.

5. ~~Domestic~~ Organizations for secret subversive work.

Here the political warfare authority can ~~make~~ make a strong case for controlling itself the tactical arm for implementing a piece of political warfare strategy. Even where the armed services possess similar ~~branches~~ branches, there is need for a new type of organization corresponding to the British S.O.E.

The main conclusion from this examination appears to be that no single organization can conduct political warfare. The essential function of any political warfare authority must be an advisory and planning function, ~~implementation~~ implementation must be left largely to other organizations. The core of a sound political warfare organization would appear to be a council uniting representatives of the governmental services listed above around the concept of political warfare.

In addition to initiating political warfare plans to be executed by various ~~branches~~ branches of the government a central political warfare authority can properly assure--in addition

to the special types of intelligence required for political warfare--the execution of two types of political warfare activity: Subversive propaganda and subversive field operations. The frontiers of these last two services are hard to define and will inevitably be the subject of dispute but the necessity for independent specialized organizations --corresponding to the British FWE and SOE --for this purpose can hardly be questioned.

Inasmuch as the COI is the only ~~branch~~ branch of the U.S. government which has specialized in the various problems of political warfare, it is the organization best fitted to become the American political warfare authority with the functions proposed above. To a large degree it is already fulfilling these functions and needs only to complete its integration with other ~~branches~~ branches of the government on the one hand, and to delimit more precisely its role on the other, to become a model political warfare service, surpassing anything yet created by our allies or enemies.

II. Organization for Planning.

1. A supreme political warfare council, presided by the director of the COI should be set up for the purpose of giving official sanction to political warfare strategic plans binding upon all ~~branches~~ branches of the government represented on the council-- Army, Navy, ~~Marine~~ State Department, BEW, ~~Rockefeller~~ Rockefeller Committee, Information services. This council might be attached to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department or some other governmental agency or directly to the President or his representative. Its functions should be envisaged mainly as those of a clearing house.

2. A political warfare planning board, presided by a deputy for the director of the COI, and utilizing the central services of the COI as permanent secretariat, should be created for the

6..

purpose of framing political warfare plans for submission to the supreme political warfare council. These plans should list psychological and political objectives corresponding to the goals of national strategy and policy as defined by the chiefs of staff, State Department, etc., and suggest methods for realizing them by military, diplomatic, subversive or economic action and by propaganda and informational policy.

a) The board should include representatives of all of the services concerned with the implementation of political warfare strategy, i.e., Navy, State Department, AEC, Atomic Energy Commission, OGC, FIS, etc., etc., etc.

b) The representatives of other government departments listed above should not sit on the board but should be considered as experts detached for special service with the COI. It would be the function of the senior planning body to obtain the approval of the State Department, ~~Atomic Energy Commission~~ Services, etc., to plans. It would be the function of the experts referred to above merely to advise the COI planners on technical matters within their respective spheres relative to the delimitation of objectives or their implementation. The board would meet in plenary sessions only to approve plans in complete form for submission to the higher body, otherwise/ ^{would work} through separate working committees with the COI central planners acting as the link between them.

c) The planning secretariat of the COI should consist of a permanent secretary and two or more full-time planners. In view of the special importance of subversive propaganda and ~~subversion~~ operations in political warfare one of the full-time COI planners should act as liaison agent and consultant to the

(or FIS)
 planning body of the COI propaganda branch and another ~~one~~ to the planning organism of SOS. The central planning group or secretariat of the COI should also maintain liaison with the planning body of the nearest corresponding British organization.

III. Operational services of the COI.

Without disturbing the existing administrative organization of the COI it appears advisable that all branches of the organization should concentrate as much as possible on political warfare in order to avoid duplication of activities of other government agencies and to provide an organizational ~~basis~~ basis for the claim to being the body best fitted to direct political warfare planning operations. The following recommendations are therefore to be considered purely in a functional sense.

1. The propaganda functions of the COI should be limited to the type of propaganda, whether overt or secret, which the British term operational--obtaining specific acts of strategic value from specific groups. If the FIS remains attached to the COI a special division of the FIS should be created to specialize in this type of propaganda for all regions and the rest of the FIS allowed a large degree of autonomy in its normal informational and publicity functions, which are more closely related to the work of the OFF than to that of the COI. An ~~alternative~~ alternative solution would be to expand either SOS or Stanley's proposed branch to include operational propaganda by short-wave radio as well as publications.

In case of a separation of the FIS from the rest of the COI it would be vital to maintain the closest and friendliest ties, with multiple permanent liaison at various levels. FIS should be represented on the COI political warfare planning board and COI on the FIS planning board (A separate FIS planning board should

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be set up if FIS remains within the COI).

In either case FIS is the only organization capable of actually directing foreign broadcasting and COI should content itself with influencing FIS policy in the desired direction. The FIS regional ~~division~~ sections should be built up and if Stanley's group remains a separate branch it should be serviced by the FIS regional sections.

2. In the operations of SOS a distinction should be made between the types of activity resembling guerilla warfare and Commando work and non-violent ^{subversive} ~~subversive~~ operations: Rumors, forgeries and all types of clandestine propaganda activity in the field. These should be greatly developed and co-ordinated with the activities of the Stanley and FIS field representatives. Military and paramilitary activities should either be left to the army or become a separate section of SOS. An alternative solution would be to amalgamate the civilian SO activities with Stanley's organization. In any case Stanley and/or SOS should have separate planning bodies of their own, with one of the COI planners assisting them.

3. SIS and R&A should concentrate more and more on the types of intelligence of peculiar importance to political warfare. Though each may be able from time to time to render valuable services in a wider field, their primary purpose and official raison d'etre should be to provide the data and intelligence necessary for the framing of political warfare plans and their execution.

IV. The COI Planning Board.

1. Because of the intimate relationship between foreign propaganda and political warfare in general, it is important that Mr. Sherwood should act as chairman of the COI Planning Board. It would

be particularly important in case the FIS is separated from the COI. Since the FIS in that case would continue to be represented on the Planning Board there should be no particularly difficulty in arranging for the director of FIS to continue to act as deputy for planning to the director of the COI. Inasmuch as a new type of political warfare plan must be created it is probably advisable that I should serve myself as secretary of the group with responsibility for the form of the plan. My assistant in that case should ~~xxxxxx~~ be chosen with the idea of being able to relieve me of routine duties in connection with the drafting of plans and the organization of the committee's secretarial work. I ~~could~~ could at the same time act as planning consultant to SOS and Stanley. Wallace Duell should act as planning consultant to the intelligence side-- ~~and~~ and/or JIS. Jim Warburg should act as planning consultant to the FIS planning board which should be reconstituted around Francis Miller, unless he prefers to remain in FIS and to be the official representative of FIS on the Planning Board.

2. The plans drafted by the COI board should be for political warfare campaigns as a whole and should be split up into separate sections containing recommendations in the military, diplomatic, ~~and~~ economic, SO and publicity spheres. SOS, Stanley and FIS should frame ^{working} separate plans based on the general COI plan. Recommendations in the military and diplomatic spheres should be chiefly confined to actions ~~which~~ calculated to give direct assistance to propaganda or SO activities and not involving major operations.

7/2/52. *gill*

Certain Elements Which Should Guide Determination of
Working Relationship Between
C.I. & Joint Chiefs of Staff

I. Who shall determine what information is to be presented to J.C.S.?

Desideratum: (a) C.I. to be assigned subjects by J.C.S. or J.C.S. for subsequent report.

(b) C.I. to be assigned subjects for report and submission to J.C.S.

II. Information from what sources will be considered authoritative and referred to J.C.S.?

Desideratum: (a) Material derived from J.C.S. to be deemed authoritative and referred to J.C.S. subject to a final review or report to J.C.S.

III. Who shall be authorized to collect and evaluate information for use of the J.C.S.?

Desideratum: (a) C.O.I. to be one of the units to so serve.

(b) C.O.I. to be available also to act as the coordinating factor for other units who may report to J.C.S.

(c) Designated personnel of C.O.I. to have access to such J.I.C. and other official material as is necessary to permit C.O.I. to function in its work for J.C.S. and J.I.C.

The following information is being furnished to you for your information and is not to be distributed outside your agency.

It is requested that you keep this information confidential.

Very truly yours,
 [Signature]

Enclosed for you are two copies of a letterhead memorandum from the [Agency] dated [Date] and captioned [Subject].

Very truly yours,
 [Signature]

A. R.
 May 19, 1947



LONDON REPRESENTATIVE

Registered 895655
LONDON 11/19
LONDON
COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

LONDON, November 19, 1941

Dear Colonel:

The enclosed memorandum is being presented by General Ismay to the Prime Minister. I hope that it is self-explanatory, except that perhaps we need to translate General Ismay's word "pipe" into our word "channel."

I am very grateful for the policy cables which you have been sending and which have so promptly answered all my questions. For example, those relating to relations with General Ismay, to the proposed publicity release (which has been abandoned in accordance with your instructions), to the political battle going on here between the two Ministers, and to Representative Snyder.

Very sincerely yours,

Wm. Dwight Whitney
Wm. Dwight Whitney

Colonel William J. Donovan
Coordinator of Information
Washington, D.C.

**LOCK AND KEY
DOCUMENT****SECRET**

LONDON, November 18, 1941

**SCOPE AND METHOD
OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO U.S.A.
VIA MR. DWIGHT WHITNEY**

The purpose of the Mission is set out in Annex B in full. In sum, it is to supplement existing pipes of communication, by ensuring that the President, through Colonel Donovan, has a balanced picture of the British viewpoint. It is expected that this object will be attained by the transmittal from time to time (not daily or at any other regular interval) of messages

- (i) supplementing and amplifying communications through the existing pipe from the Prime Minister to the President;
- (ii) supplying correctives to what we may consider misinterpretations or unjust criticisms of British activities.

In effect, the purpose will be to argue the British case to the highest authorities in the United States, through a new pipe which

- (i) is supplementary to the pipe on the highest level Prime Minister to President;
- (ii) is different from the many existing pipes from American representatives to their own particular departments

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in Washington, no one of which is in a position to present a balanced picture or has the duty of presenting a definitely "British" picture.

Method of procedure will have to be developed only by practice. Some preliminary suggestions are put forward in Annex A.

Major Whitney has been provided with an office in the War Cabinet Offices. He will work solely with General Ismay. Where his communications supplement those of the existing pipe, Prime Minister to President, they will also be shown by him to the United States Ambassador.

The consideration of future plans will be taken up as particular problems arise. This is plainly the more important part of the work, but it will have to develop gradually.

What is now required, therefore, is authority to pass over Major Whitney's desk at the War Cabinet Offices current intelligence and information, that is, excluding plans.

• • • • •

ANNEX A

Major Whitney suggests that, if he is given the privilege of access to a reasonably wide range of documentary information, he will then be in a position to propose subjects for communication. He suggests that, in the first instance, there pass over his desk such papers as the following (with which he was familiar when serving in the Army Intelligence Corps and the Secret Operations Executive a year ago):

Admiralty Daily Summary
 " Weekly "
 War Office Daily "
 " " Weekly "
 RAF Daily Summary
 " Weekly "

Such S.I.S. papers as the British Security Officer, New York, is now authorized to show to Colonel Donovan;

Censorship summaries and intercepts;

Ministry of Economic Warfare Reports and intercepts;

Such additional daily telegrams, reports (planning and otherwise), etc., as General Ismay may determine and authorize.

* * * * *

ANNEX BPURPOSE
OF INTELLIGENCE SERVICE TO U.S.A.
VIA MR. DWIGHT WHITNEY

Whitney represents the U.S.A. Coordinator of Information (Colonel William J. Donovan), whose office was set up by the President within the President's executive offices and provided for out of his secret vote. Colonel Donovan reports directly to the President (not through any intervening Minister).

The Coordinator's office was created because the President was not satisfied with the existing "pipes" through which he was receiving intelligence. As the only channel of intelligence to the President were the existing individual departments (the Service departments through their intelligence divisions, and the other departments, each acting independently, e.g. State Department, Treasury, Justice, etc.), the President felt the lack of a complete picture of the situation. In particular, he felt the lack of material against which to measure both intelligence and proposed plans of a character that appeared, from the viewpoint of his general attitude toward the war, to be unduly conservative, obstructionist, isolationist.

- 2 -

defeatist, or merely fragmentary and piecemeal.

The function of the Donovan office was therefore to be of two characters, (i) coordination of existing "pipes," and (ii) development of supplementary and corrective "pipes."

Pursuant to the second purpose, the President authorized Colonel Donovan to send a small staff to London. The London office is provided with its own cipher, by which communications can be sent directly to Colonel Donovan, for submission by him to the President.

It was hoped that the London Representative might particularly reflect and emphasize the British viewpoint. In this respect the duty of the London Representative was different from that of the representatives of particular U.S. departments. He is free from the obligation, to which they may at any moment be subject, of representing a departmental interest which may be adverse to the interest of the "opposite number" British ministry. His position in the general intelligence field is in this respect comparable to that of Mr. Harriman in the supply field.

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Major Whitney was chosen for this function because he had served in the British Army, and had other connections so predisposing him in favour of the British cause and viewpoint (e.g. member of Oxford University, barrister of Inner Temple, English wife, etc.), that it might reasonably be hoped that he would be at pains to present it.

No instructions were given to Major Whitney as to the method by which he should obtain the result. It was felt that that was a British problem.

Major Whitney was provided with the same cover as the Donovan organization, viz. to have charge of the transmittal of public intelligence and of broadcasting to the continent of Europe. The public part of his work will be carried on by an independent staff, having an independent office under his direction, and in touch with the M. of I, B.B.C., etc.

The secret part of his work will be carried on in collaboration with Secret Intelligence Service, the Secret Operations Executive and the Security Coordination Officer, with all of whom he is already in contact. In each of these cases, his work will be done, directly or through assistants, in liaison with the particular British office concerned. These are supplemental

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activities which concern the Ministry of National Defence only indirectly.

His work with the Ministry of National Defence will be conducted from the War Cabinet Offices, where he has been provided with an office. He will make no communications in that sphere except after showing them to General Ismay.

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COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

INTEROFFICE MEMO

FROM: Thomas G. Early *ME*
 TO: Col. G. Edward Buxton
 SUBJECT: Organization of the Executive Office


DATE May 25, 1942

In line with the discussions in which the Committee has participated concerning the activities of the Executive Branch, and in order that more efficient operation may be established within the Executive Branch, there is submitted herewith for your consideration a draft of an Administrative Order which realigns the functions of the Executive Branch to insure adequate and efficient administration. The basic organizational structure of the Executive Branch at the present time is as follows:

1. An Executive Officer, who is responsible to the Coordinator for the over-all direction of the administrative functions of the agency as a whole.
2. A Planning and Procedures Officer, as a staff officer to the Executive Officer, on organization and administrative planning and procedures.
3. A Budget and Finance Division, responsible to the Executive Officer for the direction of financial, budgetary, and administrative service operation functions.
4. A Personnel Division, responsible to the Executive Officer for personnel management.
5. A Registry Office, responsible to the Executive Officer for all communications activities of the agency.

It is recommended that the following basic organizational structure be set up in lieu of the present one:

1. An Executive Officer, his functions remaining the same.



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of the agency as a whole can be more thoroughly defined and justified and administered rather than placing this full responsibility into the hands of one person, which is now the case and which is not working to the satisfaction of the respective officers of the agency. Also, this set up follows closely the budgetary responsibilities and functions as administered in other large Federal agencies.

There is attached a chart setting forth the organization as proposed herein.

Attachments

ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER

Number:

Issued:

Effective:

SUBJECT: DELEGATION OF ADMINISTRATIVE AUTHORITY

The administrative functions of the Coordinator of Information are hereby defined, and the responsibility and authority for their execution delegated in the following manner:

EXECUTIVE OFFICE

A Deputy Coordinator - to serve as Executive Officer for the Coordinator; to originate and direct administrative policies for the Washington, field, and foreign offices; to advise the Coordinator on the administration and coordination of each major activity or branch and office, in addition to being ultimately responsible for the coordination of all management functions and for all arrangements for all field and foreign offices; to be responsible for the direction of all budget, personnel management, organizational planning, finance, approval of travel orders, and procedural functions for the Coordinator. Under the direction of the Executive Officer there is established the following organizational units with functions and responsibilities as set forth below:

Administrative Management Division - to be responsible to the Executive Officer for organization and administrative planning and procedural functions for the Washington and field offices, including the long-range planning and development of administrative procedures; for assistance in the coordination of the activities of the various offices and divisions under the direction of the Executive Officer; for the determination of the adequacy of staff facilities and services; for the

- 2 -

planning, assignment and control of space, including parking space; for the preparation or review and control over the issuance of all administrative orders, instructions, and office notices; for summarizing the progress made by all the branches, divisions, and offices of the Coordinator in the carrying out of their activities during the month, based upon monthly reports submitted by each branch director and division head; for the preparation, revision, and cancellation and control over the issuance of all administrative forms; for the approval of all requisitions for reproduction of material of an administrative nature; to review and give prior approval to all requests for reproduction equipment; to advise the Director of Personnel Management on organizational planning as it relates to administrative efficiency.

Service Operations and Fiscal Office - responsible to the Executive Officer for the direction of administrative services, both in Washington and in the Field, including the auditing and accounting for all funds. The Service Operations and Fiscal Office shall consist of the following sections, with functions as established below:

- (a) A Fiscal Section - to be responsible to the Service Operations and Fiscal Officer for the audit and certification of purchase, payroll, travel, adjustment, refund, other vouchers and retirement deductions; for the determination as to the legality of proposed expenditures, the availability of appropriations, and the

- 3 -

sufficiency of funds; for the maintenance of a system of operating accounts to insure effective control over operating expenses and obligations; for the preparation of necessary financial statements and accounting reports; for the review of requests for travel orders and issuance of request books and travel orders for approved travel within the limitations of authority administratively delegated; and for the performance of any other fiscal and accounting operations.

- (b) A Service Operations Section - to be responsible to the Service Operations and Fiscal Officer for service operations for the Washington office, including procurement of all property and supplies; obtaining of priority preference ratings; preparation of all contracts for services, supplies, and space; distribution and maintenance of stock of property and supplies; all moving operations, including telephone installation; telephone and teletype services; and maintenance of a reproduction shop.

Personnel Management Division - a Director of Personnel, to be responsible to the Executive Officer for the recruitment and placement of all personnel; position classification; for training, promotion and employee relations and welfare functions; for all liaison activities concerning personnel matters; and organizational and functional planning as they relate to personnel management. The Personnel

- 4 -

Management Division shall consist of the following sections, with functions as established below:

- (a) An Assistant Director of Personnel, to be responsible to the Director of Personnel to develop in-service training programs, assist in the direction of all personnel activities and organizational planning as it relates to personnel management.
- (b) An Employment Section, to be responsible to the Director of Personnel for the recruitment and placement of adequate personnel; for adherence to an adequate promotion policy; for directing morale activities; for the execution of the in-service training program; for providing stenographic assistance to the operating offices on call.
- (c) A Classification Section, to be responsible to the Director of Personnel for the proper classification of all positions in the offices of the Coordinator of Information, including review and approval of classifications in the field offices; for the conducting of functional operating organizational surveys concerning lines of authority, functional spans of control and operating relationships as they relate to personnel management.
- (d) An Appointment Officer, to be responsible to the Director of Personnel for the preparation

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and maintenance of all personnel records, including payrolls, time, retirement, and leave records; and routing control over personnel actions.

- (c) A Head Nurse, First Aid Office, to be responsible to the Director of Personnel for the provision of emergency first aid assistance to injured or ill employees.

Registry Office - to be responsible to the Executive Officer for carrying out the functions set forth in Administrative Order No. 10.

In lieu of a Budget Office for the Coordinator there is hereby established a Budget Committee, to be composed of the Assistant Coordinator as Chairman, the Executive Officer, the Director of Personnel Management, the Director of Administrative Management, and a member of the Coordinator's immediate staff. The Budget Committee will be responsible to the Coordinator for the review and justification of all annual budget estimates and such supplemental estimates as may be necessary from time to time submitted to it by the various branch directors.

The Committee shall also be responsible for reviewing all budgetary problems of the various branches and making recommendations to the Coordinator as to the necessary action. In determining the budgetary requirements of the various branches on the basis of preliminary information submitted to the Committee shall hold such hearings as are necessary with representatives of the branches and submit its recommendations and approve budgetary requirements to the Director of Administrative Management Division for correlation into proper presentation form for submission to the Budget Bureau and/or Congressional Appropriations Committees.

It will be the responsibility of the Service Operations and Fiscal Officer to establish the necessary controls for the expenditure of such funds as may be appropriated to the Coordinator of Information.

- 6 -

FIELD OFFICES

Administrative Officers, Field Offices (United States) - to be responsible to the Executive Officer for the coordination of all administrative functions in the field office, including collaboration with the administrative officials of the branches or divisions located in that office, and when necessary, the Personnel Management Division, the Administrative Management Division, the Service Operations and Fiscal Office, and the Registry Office in personnel, management, and administrative service functions, including mail control and files, maintenance and supply and reproduction; for procurement of property and supplies in accordance with existing contracts and instructions without prior authorization from the Washington Office except in cases of purchases involving more than \$1000; for preparation of all purchase, travel, and payroll vouchers to be submitted to the Service Operations and Fiscal Office for audit and payment; all new contracts and leases to be referred to the Service Operations and Fiscal Office for approval; for the maintenance of a Registry Office in accordance with such instructions as may be issued by the Registry Officer; for assignment of space in accordance with over-all plans approved by the Administrative Management Division, Washington; for consulting with and advising operating officials in that office on administrative problems as they arise.

The provisions of Administrative Orders No. 1, Effective September 11, 1941, and 1A, Effective January 12, 1942, are hereby rescinded.

William J. Donovan
Coordinator

C.O.I. 9626

X Order of President

X Setting Up

X Freeborns, Inc.

December 18, 1942

Commander William L. Freeman
 Aid to the Chief of Staff to the
 Commander-in-Chief of the
 Army and Navy
 The White House
 Washington, D. C.

My dear Commander Freeman:

In accordance with telephonic request of
 your office this morning, I am enclosing the Presi-
 dential order of July 11, 1941, setting up a Coordi-
 nator of Information.

Sincerely,

James R. Murphy

DESIGNATING A COORDINATOR OF INFORMATION

By virtue of the authority vested in me as President of the United States and as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, it is ordered as follows:

1. There is hereby established the position of Coordinator of Information, with authority to collect and analyze all information and data, which may bear upon national security; to correlate such information and data, and to make such information and data available to the President and to such departments and officials of the Government as the President may determine; and to carry out, when requested by the President, such supplementary activities as may facilitate the securing of information important for national security not now available to the Government.
2. The several departments and agencies of the Government shall make available to the Coordinator of Information all and any such information and data relating to national security as the Coordinator, with the approval of the President, may from time to time request.
3. The Coordinator of Information may appoint such committees, consisting of appropriate representatives of the various departments and agencies of the Government, as he may deem necessary to assist him in the performance of his functions.

2

4. Nothing in the duties and responsibilities of the Coordinator of Information shall in any way interfere with or impair the duties and responsibilities of the regular military and naval advisors of the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy.

5. Within the limits of such funds as may be allocated to the Coordinator of Information by the President, the Coordinator may employ necessary personnel and make provision for the necessary supplies, facilities, and services.

6. William J. Donovan is hereby designated as Coordinator of Information.

(Signed) Franklin D. Roosevelt

THE WHITE HOUSE

July 11, 1941

COT 9916

Page 30000

OFFICE OF STRATEGIC SERVICES

INTEROFFICE MEMO

TO: Mr. James H. Murphy

DATE: January 15, 1945

FROM: William L. Langer

SUBJECT:

Attached you will find a translation of the relevant portions of the document for sent to yesterday.

William L. Langer

William L. Langer,
Director, Branch of
Research and Analysis

Attachment.

Translation of paragraphs from Polisovik, a Theoretical
in Politics Journal, July 1944

(The first page contains the beginning of an article on Russian pro action. The second is page 4 of the magazine, and the third is a of an article on subversive Nazi activities in the United States. The material on the 101 appears in paragraphs 2, 3, 4, 5, and reads as follows:)

"In June 1944 in Moscow of the first part of the U.S.A. there was established a special agency - the Office of Coordination of Information, at the head of which was installed the famous Colonel Vladimir Lenov, a participant in the first world war. This man was assigned the task of giving a united leadership to the propaganda efforts of foreign propaganda in the U.S.A. and to the American propaganda.

"Colonel Lenov's office is a work of distinguished specialists and experts on all subjects. Radio receivers and broadcasting stations have been set up, destined for special services to the countries of Europe, Africa, Asia, the Near East, and Latin America. The reception and broadcasting are monitored around the clock, and all information received through radio stations is daily worked over and compared with naval and military intelligence data and information received by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (State Department) from its foreign embassies and missions, and from other sources.

"The activities of Colonel Lenov's office assist the 'Federal Communications Commission' established together with the 'Defense Communications Board' as well as the so-called 'Federal Monitoring Service'. (This seems to mean the Foreign Broadcast Intelligence Service of the Federal Communications Commission, since the article goes on to describe listening posts and activities of a type carried on by this organization. The remainder of the article is about other agencies.)

Dr. Langer

To: _____

Mr. Murphy would like to
have this translated, please.

M. O'Donnell

10 F.N.

Director's Office

(3308)